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the large proportion of claims settled at an earlier stage. But it is at the
same time reassuring to discover, from reading this book, that the legal
principles, now established for centuries in the various modes of transportation, are rather uniform and stable . Although some scholars may
think that this study only whets the appetite, it is highly recommended that
practitioners in the field of transport law, in Canada especially but also
in other common law countries, have the book at hand . If the copy of the
book that they ordered is damaged when delivered by a motor carrier,
they will know what to do.

Equality Rights and the Canadian Charter ofRights and Freedoms
Edited by ANNE F. BAYEFSKY and DIARY EBERTS .
Toronto : Carswell . 1985 . Pp. xliv, dol . ($85 .00)
eviewed by Mary Jane Mossman*
The publication of this volume of essays on equality rights under the
Charter is an important event in Canada. In appearing so soon after April
17, 1985 (the date when the Charter's main equality provision, section
15, became effective) the essays clearly preceded decisions in actual
cases litigated on the basis of section 15 . Yet, precisely because the book
was in the vanguard of the cases, it provided a significant opportunity for
the authors to have a part in defining the issues and shaping the legal
arguments, and thereby influence the nature ofjudicial decisions in Canadian equality cases for the future .' Viewed from this perspective, the book
is successful as a thorough analysis of the background to equality discourse in Canada, although it may be less helpful as a design for thinking
about equality as we approach the twenty-first century.

*Mary Jane Mossman, of Osgoode Hall Law School, York University, Toronto,
Ontario. Thanks are due to Mr. S .E . Wolfson for help in assembling research materials
related to equality rights .
' Prior to the publication of Equality Rights, there were two articles which generally
canvassed the meaning of section 15 . See Marc Gold, A Principled Approach to Equality
Rights : A Preliminary Inquiry (1982), 4 Sup . Ct. L .R . 13 1 ; W.S . Tarnopolsky, The
Equality Rights, in W.S . Tarnopolsky and G.-A. Beaudoin (eds .), Canadian Charter of
Rights and Freedoms : Commentary (1982), p. 396.
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The book is broad in scope. Thirteen authors have provided their
separate insights on the meaning of equality in differing contexts, corresponding primarly to the enumerated grounds of section 15 : race and
ethnicity, religion, sex, age, physical and mental disability . There are two
essays as well on the non-enumerated grounds of marital status and sexual
orientation, and three essays on related sections of the Charter: section
28, guaranteeing rights equally to male and female persons; the group of
sections guaranteeing special status for aboriginal peoples, and section
32, defining the application of the Charter. One of the editors, Anne
Bayefsky, has also contributed a very thorough essay on the general
framework for equality analysis, including Canadian, American, and international law approaches .
This breadth of scope and the differing perspectives of individual
contributors is at once both the book's major strength and also its weakness . Its strength comes from the richness of analysis of the nature of the
grounds being examined, particularly in the essays on the enumerated
grounds of section 15 . For example, William Black's examination of the
underlying rationale for guaranteeing non-discrimination on the ground of
religion provides some excellent insights on the issues of whether courts
should adopt a broad or narrow definition of religion, and the basis for
distinguishing religion from secular matters. Similarly, the essay by
David Lepofsky and Jerome Bickenbach explains very clearly the nature
of societal barriers for those who are physically "less-abled", and the fact
that the idea of disability itself is not constant: "The extent to which one's
physical disability imposes a true barrier to the undertaking of various
tasks is constantly being reduced by the development of revolutionary
aids and adaptive devices. "s This "non-static" aspect of the enumerated
grounds in section 15 is also clearly addressed in Jeffery Wilson's essay
on the age ground as it affects children . As he explains : 4 "The definition
of childhood has changed in accordance with the structure and expectations of society. The present definition of childhood and our values towards
children may be no more valid than that which was articulated in earlier
times." Even our definition of who is "Indian" has changed over time;
moreover Douglas Sanders argues cogently for decentralized decisionmaking by bands as to who is to be recognized as a band member rather
than a national system of determining such status, a suggestion which
thereby requires even more flexibility in our understanding of such concepts . Raj Anand's essay on ethnic equality similarly recognizes that
changes in legislative policies have occurred, in relation to both native

2

Pp . 133-140.
3 P 326 .
4 P 297 .
5 P 561 .
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peoples and other immigrant groups, 6 and suggests that the Charter may
be a useful tool in developing a climate of acceptance for multiculturalism
in Canada. Arnold Bruner's essay on sexual orientation, by contrast,
poignantly describes the effect of an absence of tolerance and protection
from discrimination in Canadian society.'
At the same time however, the book is less satisfying in some aspects
of the analysis of the legal effect of section 15 . First, while there is
substantial unanimity about the relation between section 15 and section 1,
the restatement of the argument in each essay results in unnecessary
repetition . Second, most of the authors reject the automatic application of
the three-tier level of scrutiny approach of the American jurisprudence,
but there are some important but unresolved differences in their suggestions. Anne McLellan, for example, states that the enumerated grounds of
section 15 are likely to be treated as inherently suspect, except for "age
and mental and physical disability", 8 a conclusion directly contrary to
that of the authors of essays on those enumerated grounds. However,
neither this issue nor others are really joined in these essays in a meaningful way; there is no communication among the authors, just single voices,
and their different views are not therefore fully explored . Third, there is a
general expectation expressed by most authors that section 15 will effect
changes and that the changes will be beneficial to those affected . Some of
the conclusions drawn are supportable, however, only on the basis that
judicial decisions will indeed reflect an entirely new approach to constitutional analysis,' and moreover that the "activist" stance evident in the
Supreme Court's decisions on legal rights under the Charter l° will not
change when equality claims are presented for decision . That such conclusions are drawn in the absence of a systematic analysis of the structure
of law and the role of courts, particularly in the context of equality
claims, is problematic .
Thus, despite the richness of the analysis of the nature of section
15's enumerated grounds, and the evident dynamic quality in conceptualizing about such ideas as age or disability, the legal analysis of the
meaning of equality under section 15 in these essays is relatively less
helpful. While there is some useful information about the constitutional
process out of which section 15 was created, especially in the general

6 Pp . 85-89.
Pp . 457-459 .
s P 434.
9 There have been a number of contrary views expressed. For example, see P
Russell, The Effect of a Charter of Rights on the Policy-Making Role of Canadian Courts
(1982), 25 Can. Pub. Admin. 1 ; P 1-logg,.Canada Act 1982, Annotated (1982) .
1° See R. v. Big M. Drug Mart Ltd., [1985] 1 S.C .R . 295; Singh v. Minister of
Employment and Immigration, [1985] 1 S.C .R . 177.
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overview essay by Anne Bayefsky and more particularly in relation to
section 28 in the essay by Katherine de Jong, the legal analysis is necessarily more often directed to assessing the past treatment of particular
grounds of discrimination under the Canadian Bill of Rights, federal and
provincial human rights codes, American doctrines or international covenants than to thinking about whether a new conceptual framework is
either necessary or desirable. What is missing is any sense of imagination
as to how we could or should approach these issues, and whether the
constraints of the past are inevitable . What would a world that offered
equality (a world none of us has ever experienced) look like after all, and
is the Charter relevant to such a question?"
Equality Rights does include some thoughts of this kind . The essay
on section 32 by Yves de Montingy, for example, provides a thoughtful
analysis as to why we should support a broader interpretation of the
application of the Charter, at least in relation to section 15, than has been
recommended by other commentators 12 In his view, the need to provide
protection for individuals from state actions is much less pressing than the
need for such protection from other sources :"
It must be remembered, however, that if the state can oppress, and is seen as the
main potential invader of individual liberty, it is merely because it wields more
power than the individual since it is in a position of superiority. Once we recognize
this fact, we are inexorably led to the conclusion that if we are to obtain the
individual liberty so prized by our ancestors, both the powers of the state and those
powers of large-scale private organizations and of individuals, must in our day be
restricted . . . Regardless of the way we choose to implement the Charter judicially
so as to make it applicable to private relations, we must realize that oppression
originating from the state is only the tip of the iceberg, a particular aspect of a more
general phenomenon, namely, the threat which the strong can bring to bear upon the
weak.

Such re-conceptualizing about basic structures which constrain equality
objectives is evident as well in Mary Eberts' essay on sex discrimination .
Her recognition of the implicit male norm in existing sex discrimination
theory and her suggestions for adopting a sex neutral/gender specific
standard in its place" also represent a re-vision of the equality concept.

1 For two different views about the answer to this question, see P Russell, The
Political Purposes of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (1983), 61 Can, Bar
Rev. 30; and N. Lyon, The Charter as a Mandate for New Ways of Thinking about Law
(1984), 9 Queen's L.J . 241 .
12
See K. Swinton, Application of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, in
Tarnopolsky and Beaudoin, op . cit., footnote 1, p. 41 ; Hogg, op . cit., footnote 9.
13 Pp . 578-579; de Montigny relies (for inspiration at least) on D. Gibson, The
Charter of Rights and the Private Sector (1982), 12 Man. L.J . 213; and R. MacDonald,
Postscript and Prelude-The Jurisprudence of the Charter: Eight Theses (1982), 4 Sup. Ct.
L.R . 321 . De Montigny's analysis is, however, more persuasive on the issue that there is a
need for protection for those who are oppressed than that the court, pursuant to the
Charter, is the appropriate means of providing such protection .
14 P 220 ff.
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Yet, as a whole, Equality Rights seems more useful as a record
(often somewhat dismal) of what equality has meant in the past, rather
than any sustained assessment of what it could mean for the future .
Moreover, the constraint of thirteen separate voices results in envisioning
that is piecemeal when it does occur at all. Left out of the analysis
completely is any sense of how the protection of equality rights for one
individual may impact on another individual ." Even more significantly,
the book never really adresses the effect of the section 15 protection on
the overall legislative programs of the modern welfare state. Some of the
ideas presented about retirement and pensions in the essay by Elizabeth
Atcheson and Lynne Sullivan, and those of David Vickers and Orville
Endicott on mental disability, recognize the need to articulate values
within our society consistent with section 15 . As well, there are some
hints in Anne Eayefsky's essay, as in Anne McLellan's, that problems
may occur in accommodating equality claims to legislative programs
directed to specific groups but they are never fully or systematically
addressed . The possibility, for example, that section 15 may prohibit laws
which discriminate against those who are economically disadvantaged (as
an unenumerated ground), as was the case under the American equal
protection analysis at one time, 16 is an aspect of equality analysis that is
indigenous to the Charter and relies on our re-vision of our future rather
than our past . The fact that a constitutional decision was made to entrust
such questions to courts rather than only to legislatures" does not negate
our need to evaluate the issues in light of our overall objectives for the
future .
It happened that I read most of Equality Rights during a recent visit
to Australia. While I was there, I took advantage of the time and place to
travel to the central Australian desert to view Valley's Comet. While the
comet was an .interesting sight, it was really the Milky Way that is blazed
in my memory of that night . Ear out in the Australian desert, miles away
15
Also ignored is the possible impact of reading section 15 together with otherrights
and freedoms guaranteed by the Charter. For an analysis of section 15 in relation to section
7, section 10(b), and section 11 (d)-in respect of the potential right to legalrepresentation
under provincial legal aid schemes-see M .J . Mossman, The Charter and the Right to
Legal Aid (1985), 1 J .L . & Soc . Pol. 21 . See also Christine Boyle, Women and the Right
to Counsel, C.B .A : Conference, unpublished (1985) .
16
See, for example, J. Hathaway, Poverty Law and Equality Rights (1985), 1 J.L . &
Soc. Policy 1 ; F Michelman, Foreword : On Protecting the Poor Through the Fourteenth
Amendment (1969), 83 Harv. L.Rev. 7; Galloway, The Rich and the Poor in Supreme
Court History (1982) ; R. Siegel, Socioeconomic Human Rights : Past and Future (1985), 7
Human Rts. Q. 255; D. Woodward, Affirmative Constitutional Overtones: Do Any Still
Sound for the Poor? (1985), 7 Human Rts. Q. 268.
17 For an analysis of the impact of this choice, particularly in the context of legislativelydesigned social welfare state benefits, see FL . Morton and L. Pat, The Impact of the
Charter of Rights on Public Administration (1985), 28 Can . Pub. Admin. 221 .
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from the lights of civilization, there were millions of stars visible in the
Milky Way that I had never seen--or imagined-before . A phenomenon
that I have seen many times before was, quite suddenly, a wholly different experience . Somehow, I think a world of real equality may be just that
different from the one we now have, and it seems necessary to try to
imagine what it would look like in order to get from here to there.
Equality Rights is a good beginning, but only just the beginning of that
re-visioning .

Strikes, Dispitte Procedures, and Arbitration : Essays on Labor Law.
By WILLIAM B . GouLD IV.
Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press . 1985 . Pp. xi, 313. (U.S . $39.95)
Reviewed by Elizabeth Bilson*
For a Canadian practitioner or student of labour law, this book is at once
interesting and puzzling . It is puzzling because, to those of us who
participate in a discipline whose academic and critical traditions are in
their infancy, it seems somehow extravagant to put between hard covers a
book of this specialized kind, while we are still waiting for basic texts,
commentaries and primary materials which are difficult to produce for the
limited Canadian audience .
It is at the same time interesting, for a number of reasons, not the
least of which is that the book springs from an act of considerable academic courage-the decision of the author to edit, comment on and
arrange for a public audience a selection of his work produced over a
period of two decades concerning the ever-fascinating topic of strategies
for dealing with labour disputes .
The subject is interesting in itself, of course . There are enormous
difficulties in providing an appropriate legal framework--from the point
of view of the public as well as the parties-for a process which depends
heavily on the exercise of the delicate skills of negotiating, consensusbuilding and the careful calculation of relative interests, as well as on the
exercise of economic power. None of this is self-evidently amenable to
statutory supervision, and the merits and deficiencies of various legislative attempts at the regulation of a system which is driven by such pas*R . Elizabeth Bilson, of the College of Law, University of Saskatchewan, Saskatoon, Saskatchewan .

